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Starting with evidence that United Kingdom Continental Shelf oil and gas companies 
have benefitted very disproportionately from the recent penod of very high oil prices, this 
paper traces the history of this weakness in the UK's petroleum fiscal regime Evidence 
is provided that the progressive relaxations in the UK's petroleum fiscal regime in 1983. 
1987-88 and 1993 were' largely unnecessary to stimulate the development of new, 
smaller, marginal' fields; misguided in their assumption that such fields were more costly 
to develop than earlier counterparts or larger contemporary fields, and impotent 
compared with the effects of oil price movements. The paper concludes with a 
conceptualisation which illuminates why these failures of policy were not just random: 
they emerged from the UK's 'non-proprietorial' stance with respect lo the country's oil 
and gas resources, a stance which assumes responsibility for oil company profitability 
and vainly tries to counter market forces at the expense of government revenues. 
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1. Introduction 
A little noticed fact of UK fiscal policy was that as the {Brent} oil price rose from 
S55/barrel to S72 between 2005 and 2007. the UK's tax revenues from its still 
substantial oil and gas production actually went down from £9.4 billion to £7.8 
billion (Table 1). It is probably safe to assume that no other oil and gas-producing 
nation had such an experience. Why did the UK - particularly given that at $55 
per barrel oil prices were already way above costs, and that any increase from 
this level would Iherefore imply pure windfall profit for companies? A superficial 
response would be that such a decline in the UK's fiscal revenues at such high 
and rising oil prices must reflect the decline in UK oil and gas production But did 
it? II is certainty true (see Table 1} that since the turn of the century UK oil and 
gas production has been declining sharply: oil by 44% from its 1999 peak and 
gas by 35% from its 2000 peak. It is also true that between 2005 and 2007 in 
particular, the UK's total oil plus gas equivalent production fell by as much as 
18%. However, the corresponding inference thai it was to be expected that 
revenues should decline pro-rata with production is entirety misplaced. 
Production may have been declining, but rising prices resulted in rising profits: 
the Net (after depreciation) Operating Sufplus from the UK Continental Shelf 
(UKCS) rose by £4.2 billion between 2005 and 2006 (as tax revenues felt) and in 
2007 this surplus was still above its 2005 level, but tax revenues were £1.5 billion 
less (Table 1) 
Table 1: UKCS Production Prices. Profits and Taxation 1980-2007 
Making this particular point though, is just to pick up on a striking symptomatic 
anomaly - for there are three more general indications that something is amiss 
with the UK's petroleum fiscal regime. Firstly, despite the introduction of a 
Supplementary Corporation Tax ('Supplementary Charge') of 10% in January 
2001. and its subsequent increase to 20% in January 2006 (see Appendix 1). the 
surplus which UKCS companies accumulated between 2002 and 2007 was an 
astronomical £63.9 billion (Table 2). This is what UKCS companies were left with 
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after meeting all their costs in the UK, including taxes and investment This was 
well in excess of the UKCS tax revenue accruing to the government during this 
period It was also, notably, more than three times the fiscal stimulus which the 
government has applied to the whole economy in the wake of the financial crisis 
(HM Treasury 2008). 
Table 2: UKCS Company Post Tax and Investment Surpluses Since the Introduction of 
the Supplementary Corporation Tax Charge 
Secondly, comparing the profitability of the UKCS company sector with the non-
UKCS company sector, their average pre-Corporation Tax rates of return 
between 2002 and 2007 were 26.1% and 12 2% respectively (Table 1). In other 
words, after meeting all their special tax obligations including the Supplementary 
Charge of 20%, UKCS companies enjoyed an enormous margin of profitability 
over non-UKCS companies. 
Thirdly, and looking now to Figure 1. while it is the case that the UK 
government's tax take per barrel of production has been increasing both 
absolutely and as a percentage of the oil price, it is still low in a historical 
perspective and in relation to the oil price: claiming only S15 out of a 2007 unit 
sales value of S60 per barrel of oil and gas equivalent seems rather generous/ 
Moreover, as a share of unit sales value, the government's take fell from 34% in 
2005 to just 25% in 2007. Already we seem to have prima facie evidence that 
something is wrong with the UK's petroleum fiscal regime 
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Figure 1: Tax Take per Barrel Equivalent of UKCS Oil and Gas Production 
On the other hand, perhaps this relatively light fiscal burden on the UK's oil and 
gas production can be justified? Here two arguments are commonplace. Firstly, 
and as will be demonstrated in detail in the sections below, it is argued that low 
taxation is to stimulate investment. Just focusing for the moment on the recent 
past, Table 3 shows that this argument is without foundation: the most that has 
been reinvested in the UKCS by companies in the last eight years has been 25% 
of Gross (including depreciation) Operating Surplus. Three quarters was not. 
Secondly, it is argued that companies could not withstand further increases in tax 
because of dramatically increasing operating costs (eg Oil & Gas UK. 2008. p.8; 
p 28). While this argument has already been seen to be without foundation given 
the increasing profits we have identified, it is still worth consideration with other 
data. Table 3 reveals that UKCS operating costs have indeed increased about 
threefold to over $11/barrel since 2000. However, as a proportion of unit sales 
value the increase has been much less dramatic and in 2007 only represented 
19% of the UK's unit sales value per barrel of oil and gas equivalent To bring 
these points home in another way. in 2007 the unit sales value of a UK barrel of 
oil and gas equivalent was S60, operating costs were S11 per barrel and tax was 
S15 per barrel. This still left the company take for re-investment and dividends at 
S34 per barrel of oil and gas equivalent - more than half of unit sales value 
Table 3: Investment in and Operating Costs of the UKCS 1980-2007 
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These introductory points indicate thai there are weaknesses in the UK 
petroleum fiscal regime which have prevented the UK government and its 
citizens from benefiting from the recent dramatic increases in oil pnces in the 
same way that other oil and gas producing countries have. They also indicate 
that there are two lines of enquiry which need lo be pursued in order to establish 
why this has been the case. Firstly, there are conjunctural questions about why 
the current fiscal regime has not been delivering despite the introduction Of. and 
subsequent increase in. the Supplementary Charge. Secondly, there is clearly a 
longer-term historical problem with its roots in the nineteen eighties Table 1 
shows that the government claim on company surpluses was much highef in the 
nineteen eighties. Why and how was it reduced? 
Answering these latter questions is the mam task in this paper and, as we shall 
see. they also provide the historical keys to answer the conjunctural questions. 
We shall approach them by exploring what changes have been made to the UK's 
petroleum fiscal regime since 1980. why they were made and what were their 
consequences. Reflecting the relative dearth of academic work on the 
performance of government policy with respect to the UKCS, there are few 
previous pieces of research which engage directly with this territory and none 
which does so consistently over the almost three decades since the UK became 
self-sufficient in oil. Martin (1997) is most directly pertinent with an evaluation of 
the relative impacts of government tax policy vs. technological change on UKCS 
hydrocarbon production between 1985 and 1995. The work of Kemp, Cohen, 
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Stephens and Seymour has partially engaged the territory (e.g. Kemp and 
Cohen, 1980; Kemp. 1992: Kemp and Stephens. 1996; 1997: 2000; Seymour. 
1990).2 Other wofk has focused on specialised aspects of the UK's petroleum 
fiscal regime (e.g. Devereux. 1983A. 1983B; Devereux and Morris. 1983A, 
1983B; Favero and Pesaran, 1994; Kemp and MacDonald. 1994; Saunders, 
1987), taxation principles and future policy (e.g. Bland, 1991; Boyle, 1984; Bond 
et al., 1987; Rowland and Hann, 1987; Zhang, 1997) or governmenl strategy 
(e.g. Anderson, 1993; Hann. 1986; Noreng, 1980). Rutledge and Wright (1998) 
previously established that the UKCS petroleum fiscal regime was weak in the 
past (between 1986 and 1996) and that this could not be justified by generic 
criteria such as historical and international comparisons, relatively poor UKCS 
profitability (both in relation to Ihe rest of the UK company sector and oil industry 
investment elsewhere in the world) and the particular risk associated with oil and 
gas industry investments. However, missing from the literature has been an 
evaluation of the UK's petroleum fiscal regime in terms of the outcomes of 
changes to it - seen in relation to the original objectives which it was professed 
these changes were designed to achieve. What were the professed objectives of 
the many relaxations in the UK's fiscal regime and did the latter succeed or fail in 
terms of these objectives? 
2. A Brief History of the UKCS Petroleum Fiscal Regime 
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Appendix 1 provides an outline of the changes which have been made to the UK 
petroleum fiscal regime since its inception. It reveals, first of all. a steady 
tightening as the UK got to gnps with its newly discovered hydrocarbon riches 
and the implications which they might have for government revenues. The 
starting point, in 1964, was to claim a 12.5% royalty. But it soon became 
apparent, particularly after the dramatic increases in oil prices of 1973. that this 
was too weak an instrument with which to claim a fair share of rapidly escalating 
oil revenues for UK citizens, in 1975 therefore a new tax. Petroleum Revenue 
Tax (PRT), a tax on cash flow, was chosen as the preferred instrument for 
claiming the government's share of oil rent Tax avoidance was also curtailed by 
ring fencing field operations for tax purposes Subsequently, there were 
substantial increases in PRT up to a peak of 75% in 1982 A Supplementary 
Petroleum Duty had been introduced by the first Thatcher government the 
previous year in response to dramatically high oil prices, but this was dropped in 
1982 in favour of a higher basic rale of PRT and the introduction of Advance PRT 
in order to accelerate its collection. 
From this taxation highpoint the next 10 years showed a progressive relaxation in 
the UK's petroleum fiscal regime. This involved three components: (a) targeted 
reductions in royalty obligations <b) a set of tax breaks which included breaching 
the original ring-fencing of PRT and (c) finally, the reduction of the rate of PRT 
and its partial abolition. To these different relaxations were added, coincidentally. 
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the effects of (eductions in standard Corporation Tax from 52% in 1983 down lo 
33% by 1993. 
Figure 2: Indices of UK Production. Taxation and International OH Prices 1980-2007 
Figure 2 illustrates the broad effect of these changes: the index of tax revenues 
fell very steeply and its relationship to both production and prices was changed 
quite fundamentally. The changes induced may be broadly characterised as the 
achievement of a disassociation between taxation and both production and 
prices between 1986 and 1991. followed by a disassociation between taxation 
and production between 1991 and 2000. These changes may be brought into 
sharp relief by looking at the UK government's tax take in relation to production in 
1986. 1993 and 1999 (Table 1): in 1986 the oil price was S14/barrel. oil and gas 
production was 165.6 millions of tonnes of oil equivalent (mtoe) and tax revenues 
were £4.8 billion; in 1993 the oil price was S17/barrel, oil and gas production was 
160.1 mtoe and tax revenues were just £1.3 billion; in 1999 the oil price was 
Sl8/barrel and production of 227 9 mtoe was associated with revenues of £2.6 
billion. In other words, production in 1999 was 38% greater than it had been in 
1986, but revenues were 46% less in money-of-the-day (considerably less in real 
terms) even though the oil price was higher. Significant windfalls therefore 
escaped the UK government and UK citizens without, as we shall see. a 
commensurate response from companies in terms of increasing investment. IF 
the tax take per barrel achieved in 1986 (£3.87) had been replicated in 1999, 
government revenues would have been £6.6 billion rather than £2.6 billion. 
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Looking again at Figure 2 and al Table 2, it might seem thai there may have 
been a reason for the weakening in the UK's petroleum fiscal regime: production 
had started to decline from its 1986 peak and investment was also in decline. 
The measures which weakened the UK's petroleum fiscal regime might therefore 
be seen in this light: that they were driven by an apparent decline in UK 
production and investment, and that they actually succeeded not only in arresting 
that decline but also in stimulating very substantial increases in the production of 
both oil and gas. The implication is that the weakening in the UK's petroleum 
fiscal regime was not only justified but also necessary in order to secure a future 
for UKCS production. It is this general hypothesis, which has underpinned 
government policy, that the rest of this paper is mainly concerned to investigate -
for if it is not true then government policy towards the UKCS over the past 25 
years would be deemed to have sacrificed government revenue to no avail, an 
outcome which would amount to a failure of the stewardship which governments 
should exercise over natural resources on behalf of sovereign citizens. 
3. The 1983 Relaxations: PRT reliefs and Selective Abolition of Royalties 
The first of the relaxations in the UK's petroleum fiscal regime post-1982 involved 
PRT reliefs (removal of advanced payments; cross-field offsets of exploration 
and appraisal costs against PRT; increased tax free oil allowance for new oil 
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fields outside the Southern Basin of the North Sea) and an abolition of Royalties 
on fields in the northern sector of the North Sea which had received development 
consent after April 1982 * From simply reading these measures there emerges a 
sense that the government was concerned to use tax breaks to stimulate 
investment and production in the emerging Central and Northern UKCS area of 
production Was this the motivation? From a contemporary statement of the then 
Chancellor, Mr Nigel Lawson. this is confirmed to have been the case. 
Analysis of the profitability of existing fields led the Government to conclude 
that there was no economic justification for tax or royalty reduction to 
improve returns on those fields viewed in isolation. Likewise the prospective 
rates of return of the future incremental projects to existing fields that were 
looked at appeared attractive enough not to justify special reliefs But the 
Government accepted on the basis of its analysis of the new information on 
actual projects provided Py the operators that future free-standing fields were 
likely in general to be less profitable, because they would be smaller, 
geologically more complicated and proportionately more costly to develop 
than previous fields. (Lawson. 1983. p.4) 
In the same evidence to the UK Parliaments Energy Committee Mr Lawson also 
indicated that concern about the industry's cash flow and the potentially adverse 
impact which this might have on future investment also motivated the abolition of 
advanced payments of PRT (Lawson. 1983. p.9) 
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m ihe light of current pressure on the oil and gas industry's cash flow the 
Chancellor has decided to phase oul Ihe acceleration of PRT through the 
APRT system to provide some easement in cash flow over the next few 
years, to help finance new development 
This perspective was shared completely by the then Energy Minister. Mr Hamish 
Gray, who told the Petroleum Review that Ihe tax relaxation was significant to the 
extent that it would help develop the most marginal fields in the North Sea, and at 
the same time encourage the oil and gas companies to keep investing within the 
UKCS rather than move elsewhere (Petroleum Review. May 1983. p.6). 
Two questions now present themselves in relation to this policy perspective: was 
it appropriate and was it effective In practice? The first question can be made 
more specific by way of another question - was it appropriate for a government 
to use the tax system to create an investment incentive, rather than to rely on the 
market (i.e. changes in oil prices) to make investment opportunities viable? An 
answer to this question will emerge as part of investigating whether the policy 
was effective in practice. 
To gauge whether the policy of using the petroleum fiscal regime to create 
investment incentives was effective, we use three tests: an ex-post evaluation of 
the way the changes to the fiscal regime affected field-level economics; an ex-
ante evaluation ol the same; and data on the behaviour of exploration and 
development expenditure in the targeted area (the Central & Northern North 
Sea). To do so we first of all need to identify the fields which could have 
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benefited from the fiscal relaxation. The location of these was given more 
precisely by the Finance Act of 1983 (Great Britain 1983, S.36, p 200): 
Subject to subsection (3) below, in this section ^ relevant new field' means an 
oil field-
(a) no part of which lies in a landward area, within the meaning of the 
Petroleum (Production) Regulations 1982 or in an area to the East of the 
United Kingdom and between latitudes 52" and 55" North; and 
(b) for no part of which consent for development has been granted to the 
licensee by the Secretary of State before 1" Apnl 1982; and 
(c) for no part of which a programme of development had been served on the 
licensee or approved by the Secretary of State before that date 
From the above definition it emerges that 14 offshore fields were embraced by 
the 1983 fiscal relaxation These are identified in Table 4 where the pre-1983 and 
post-1983 field economics are also shown The latter are ex-post evaluations of 
the policy based on running Wood Mackenzie's Global Economic Model (GEM) -
in its 2004 version in order to avoid the potentially distorting impact of the very 
large increases in oil prices which occurred during the last three years, It shows 
us that for four of the 14 fields. Alwyn. Clyde, Cyrus and Balmoral, the impact of 
the 1983 fiscal relaxation was insufficient to raise the internal Rate of Return 
(IRR) above the standard industry target rate of 15%. And yet the development of 
these fields went ahead anyway - indicating that the contribution of the fiscal 
relaxation was unnecessary4 Considering the other 10 fields, eight of them 
turned out to have IRRs well in excess of 15% before the fiscal relaxation, again 
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indicating that Ihe fiscal relaxation was unnecessary in order for these fields lo be 
developed. This leaves just two small fields, Duncan and Innes. upon which the 
1983 fiscal relaxations might conceivably have had an impact. Both were shut 
down along with the Argyll field in 1992 (OPL 1998. p.63). 
Table 4: The Financial Performance of Offshore Oil Fields Developed between April 
1982 and March 1987 
This though is an ex-post perspective, and although it might serve as a warning 
to governments about not taking on board perceived future company risks which 
may or may not materialise, it does not inform us about the ex-ante investment 
decision what were the expectations at the time and how might this have 
reflected on field economics? These are of course very difficult to recreate with 
such a long period of hindsight, but we can refer to expected oil prices at the 
time. These projections generally much higher than the actual outcome which 
gave us the ex-post results and using one (EIA. 1983, p.xiii) only the Cyrus field 
registers an expected IRR of less than 15%. in turn indicating that the 
expectations of the time would have made fiscal stimulus appear less rather than 
more necessary 
Other relevant data which we can observe, and which escapes the trap of ex-
post rationalisation, is the behaviour of exploration and development expenditure 
From Table 1 it can already be seen that exploration and appraisal expenditure 
initially rose after 1983 but then fell away. But what happened in the areas of the 
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North Sea which were being targeted (the Central and Northern areas) - was 
there differential behaviour as a result of the changes in the petroleum fiscal 
regime? Figure 3 shows that this was not the case with the number of exploration 
wells drilled these had been on a rising trend since 1980 in all areas of the 
UKCS and fell away in all areas after 1984. Development drilling, in contrast, 
continued on a falling trend in the Central and Northern areas of the UKCS, while 
Development drilling in the other, older areas of activity actually increased. 
Exploration and development drilling in all areas then increased up to and 
including 1988. 
Figure 3: Offshore Exploration and Development Wells Drilled between 1980 and 1987 
None of this drilling data indicates that the 1983 tax breaks had any differential 
effect on prospective new areas of exploration and development and. in fact, this 
is what one might expect - not because of the changes in taxation, but rather 
because of changing oil prices which fell sharply to a 1986 trough (Table 1). 
Actual and prospective oil prices must play the main role in the process of oil and 
gas industry investment decision-making, as the literature confirms {Pesaran and 
Favero, 1990: Seymour 1990). Moreover, Seymour (1990, p.9> points out that 
development activities are more likely to be price sensitive than exploration 
activities, because development involves larger capital expenditure than 
exploration. Oil companies might be motivated to explore, whatever the oil price 
is. in order lo build up a portfolio of reserves for eventual development. These 
observations seem to be borne out by the differential behaviour of exploration 
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and development activity in Figure 3. with exploration drilling seemingly less 
sensitive to oil price movements. 
For two principle reasons therefore: the ex-post and ex-ante profitability of the 
targeted fields; the relaxations in the UK's petroleum fiscal regime of 1983 were, 
of themselves, largely ineffective in achieving their objectives. Only two small 
fields apparently benefited and their lives were cut short in the early nineteen-
nineties Moreover, the policy of using the tax system to incentivise companies 
towards particular objectives is already emerging as relatively impotent in the 
context of the oil market: compared to tax breaks, oil price movements are much 
more powerful drivers of exploration and development decisions. 
4. The 1987-1988 Relaxations: Further Erosions of the PRT Ring-Fence and 
of Royalties 
While 1985 and 1986 saw no major changes in oil taxation, the 1987 Finance A d 
introduced the concept of the 'Cross Field Allowance', which stated: 
Where an election is made by a participator in an oil field (in this section 
referred to as "the receiving field), up to 10 percent of certain expenditure 
incurred on or after 17'1" March 1987 in connection with another field, being a 
field which Is for the purpose of this section a relevant new field shall be 
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allowable m accordance with ihis section in respect of the receiving field.. 
(Great Britain, 1987. S 65) 
The 'certain expenditure' referred to approved categories of development 
expenditure (see HM Revenue & Customs. OT13040). 10% of which could be 
offset against PRT obligations by offshore fields outside the Southern Basin of 
the North Sea and approved for development after the 17'" of March 1987. 
The 1988 Budget then further extended exemption from Royalties to all Southern 
Basin and onshore fields for which a development permit had been given after 
31 " March 1962, with effect from the beginning of July 1988 (Great Britain. 1989; 
DOE, 1988. p.72: Bland. 1991, p.26). In this regard, the Petroleum Royalties 
(Relief) and the Continental Shelf Act 1989 stated: 
(1) Petroleum won and saved from any relevant Southern Basin or onshore 
field or relevant onshore area shall be disregarded in determining whether 
any and, if so. what— 
(a) payments of royalty: and 
(b) deliveries of petroleum, are to be made in relation lo chargeable 
periods ending after 30'" June 1988 as consideration for the giant of a 
licence to which this section applies (Great Bntain, 1989. S. 1) 
The 1988 Budget also sought to reduce the PRT-exempt oil allowance down 
from 250.000 tonnes per chargeable period to 100.000 tonnes, with the 
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cumulative limit reduced from 5 million to 2 million tonnes. However, some 
haggling with the industry led to the reduction being reduced and the new 
allowance becoming 125,000 tonnes, with a cumulative limit of 2 5 million tonnes 
(DOE. 1989, p.85; KPMG, 2000, p.9; Great Britain, 1988. S 138). 
The rationale for these changes was that they were required as a response to the 
way in which the sharp decline in the oil price in 1986 had affected UKCS 
development activity. At the time the third report from the Energy Committee had 
noted with alarm that no entirely new oil developments had occurred between 
May 1986 and March 1987 and that only three developments had taken place 
earlier in 1986 (HC. 1986, p.xiii). The solution was crystallised in the comments 
which MP Mr Sproat made to the committee: 
...we have to improve, bring forward, further developments in the North Sea 
We must bring it forward when the price is low The way is through fiscal 
adjustments. (HC, 1986. p.130) 
Moreover, evidence to the Energy Committee from the industry had given greater 
specificity to the required adjustments. BRINDEX (the Association of British 
Independent Oil Exploration Companies) had suggested that permitting PRT 
relief for development costs on new fields to be claimed against tax liabilities on 
existing fields would encourage the direct re-investment of profits from mature 
fields into new development (HC. 1986. p.33). While UKOOA (the UK Offshore 
Operators Association) had suggested that reducing the royalty burden on 
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Southern Basin fields would be an important step towards making the UK oil 
taxation system purely profit-related (HC, 1986. p.35). 
Later, after the Budget, during a debate in Parliament on June 16,M. 1988, Mr 
Peter Lilley. Economic Secretary to the Treasury, would confirm that government 
thinking had indeed reflected the view of the company lobby 
To achieve an improvement in the profit-relatedness of the south North Sea 
oil regime, we had to abolish royalty entirely. 
He continued: 
....the effect of changing the regime in that way was to make it more likely 
that marginal fields would be brought forward for development and Ihe cost 
of reducing the royalty generally was met by increasing the burden tax on 
more profitable fields. 
(SC Deb (A), 16 June 1988. d29) 
Notice here the undemonstrated assumptions (a) that there was parity between 
the impact of reducing the scope of Royalties and reducing the size of the PRT 
oil allowance and (b) thai existing fields were more profitable than as yet 
undeveloped discoveries would be in the future. 
That these tax relaxations bore fruit there was no doubt at the time. For example, 
from the academic community. Seymour noted that in 1988 development 
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activities returned to pre-1986 levels and linked this turnaround with the new 
fiscal incentives, also noting (Seymour, 1990. p.24): 
From 1988 onward one can, therefore, identify a relationship between 
development activity and the fiscal regime that seems to offset the problems 
created by low and volatile oil prices. 
But was this perspective correct, or was it simply that, just like the 1983 
relaxations in the petroleum fiscal regime, the claims made for these policies 
were never put to the test? 
Before proceeding lo identify the fields targeted by these relaxations, we need to 
think about how to identify any increases in development activity which they may 
have stimulated. Development activity could, for example, be examined in terms 
of the drilling of development wells or in terms of changes in overall development 
expenditure (Seymour's perspective). This data might then also be linked to the 
areas specifically targeted by the tax breaks Such data reveals (a) an increase 
in development drilling and expenditure consequent upon the fiscal stimulus 
(Table 3) and (b) some evidence that this activity and expenditure was 
disproportionately concentrated in the target areas {Figure 3). However, the 
explicit contention of Mr Lilley above was that the objective was to facilitate the 
development of marginal fields. In other words, development drilling and 
expenditure may have increased but was the tax break essential to this 
happening? In order to test whether this was the case, we shall once again look 
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at how the relaxations affected the prospective profitability of targeted fields -
using IRRs below 15% to designate marginal fields. 
Identifying the target fields, these fall into two groups: those potentially benefiting 
from the Cross Field (Development) Allowance and those benefiting from the 
abolition in Royalties. 
To identify the fields targeted by the Cross Field Allowance, 'relevant new fields', 
the 1987 Finance Act stated: 
(1) for the purpose of the principal section •relevant new field' means, 
subject to sub paragraph (2) below, an oil field— 
(a) no part of which lies in a landward area, within the meaning of ihe 
Petroleum (Production) Regulations 1982 or in an area to the East of the 
United Kingdom and between latitudes 52° and 55° North; and 
(b) for no pari of which consent for development has been granted to the 
licensee by the Secretary of State before 17" March 1987. and 
(c) for no part of which a programme of development had been served on the 
licensee or approved by the Secretary of State before ihat date 
(Great Britain. 1987, Sch 14. Part III) 
Table 5 lists the 32 offshore fields which would benefit from the Cross Field 
Development Allowance: fields which were developed between April 1987 and 
March 1993 (the cut-off date determined by the subsequent policy changes in 
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1993 which included the abolition of the Cross Field Development Allowance) 
However, only 22 of these should be considered as target fields because ten of 
the 32 (Donan. Gryphon, Hudson. Gannet D. Angus. Hamish. Saltire. Nelson. 
Moira and Linnhe) were discovered after April 1987. The point is that the Cross 
Field Development Allowance introduced by the 1987 budget was targeting 
existing discovered fields, and these 10 fields were yet to be discovered at that 
time. 
Looking now just at the 22 targeted fields. Table 5 provides data on their ex-post 
profitability, showing how this would have stood pre-1983 and then how it was 
affected by both the 1983 fiscal relaxation and the 1987 introduction of the Cross 
Field Development Allowance. Thts data first of all serves to eliminate a further 
nine fields: Arbroath. Dunbar. Osprey, Toni, Leven. Gtamis, Gannet C, Alba and 
Ness, because they already had IRRs above 15% before 1987 (in the cases of 
Osprey and Alba because of the impact of the 1983 relaxations) and were not 
therefore marginal' at the time of the introduction of the Cross Field 
Development Allowance. In addition, any fields for which GEM is unable to define 
an IRR, or for which the post-tax IRR comes out as negative are excluded: 
development of such fields would have been driven by factors other than the 
strict application of commercial criteria and a further six of the original 32 fields 
are eliminated on this basis: Lyell. Don. Tiffany, Emerald. Blair and Crawford. 
Table 5: Fields Potentially Benefiting from the 1987-88 Petroleum Tax Relaxation 
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Following these eliminations, we ate left with just seven discovered fields which 
were discovered and marginal and whose development might therefore have 
been critically influenced by the introduction of the Cross Field Development 
Allowance: Chanter. Staffs, Gannet A, Strathspey, Scott, Miller and Kittiwake. 
These fields absorbed 41% of the £608 million {DCF value) tax break offered by 
the Cross Field Development Allowance - but the bulk of it went on just three 
fields: Miller, Scott and Kittiwake Table 5 then shows us that even after the 
combined effects of the 1983 and 1987 tax breaks, three of these seven fields. 
Gannet A, Kittiwake and Chanter, did not break through the 15% IRR threshold 
and Chanter and Gannet A remained very marginal - such that their 
development must have been driven by factors other than the strict application of 
profitability criteria In addition, the Staffa field was the first development for 
LASMO. and the company would not therefore have had any accumulated PRT 
obligations from other operations against which the development costs of Staffa 
might be set. That the Cross Field Development Allowance might have been a 
critical factor in the development of this field is therefore ruled out. The final count 
is therefore that the Cross Field Development Allowance may have been critical 
in the development of only three fields: Miller. Scott and Strathspey. 
Turning briefly to the impact of the abolition of Royalties on all offshore South 
Basin and onshore fields receiving development consent after March 1982. there 
is not a great deal to say. This is because no Southern Basin oilfields were given 
development consent after 1982. Apart from affecting a few very small onshore 
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fields, this extension in exemption (torn Royalties merely served to provide 
companies operating in the Southern Basin with a windfall gain. 
Certainly the 1987 fiscal relaxation (the Cross Field Development allowance) 
does appear to have stimulated UKCS development expenditure {non-
exploration capital expenditure) because il rose by 166% between 1987 and 
1992 (Table 3). However, here we must take account of the impact of the Piper 
Alpha disaster which occurred on July 6"\ 1988. The subsequent Cullen report 
into the disaster required companies to invest in major improvements in platform 
safety, such that development expenditure was affected by this requirement as 
well as by fiscal stimulus during this period. Fortunately, an approximate 
separation of the two factors does appear possible - Cullen reported in 
November 1990 which means that the increase in development expenditure 
which can be noted between 1987 and 1990 (an increase of 70%) cannot be 
attributed to the repercussions of Piper Alpha. Secondly, in 1991 and continuing 
in 1992 and 1993 there was a dramatic increase in non-exploration investment 
which seems liKely to have been attributable to meeting Cullen's 
recommendations. 
Nevertheless, even if it is possible to separate out some impact on development 
expenditure from the introduction of the Cross Field Development, the 
retrospective view is that most of the targeted offshore fields would have been 
developed anyway. The policy may have worked in one sense but it was 
/: 
unnecessary in another. Moreover the price which the UK government and its 
citizens paid for the government seeking to act in loco parentis tor company 
decisions was high: the government's share of UKCS net operating surplus 
slumped from 75% in 1986 to only 28% in 1991. when total revenues plumbed an 
all time low of just over £1 billion - and this at a time when oil prices were 
actually rising out of their 1986 low5 
5. The Abolition or Partial Abolition of PRT 
In 1993. and without having conducted any comprehensive review of the 
preceding relaxations in the UK's petroleum fiscal regime, the UK government 
decided to continue along the path of fiscal relaxation for the oil and gas industry 
by introducing a more general tax giveaway: 
a. With effect from June 30'". 1993. PRT was abolished for oil fields which 
had received development consent on or after 16m March 1993: 
b. With effect from June 30!n. 1993. the rate of PRT was reduced from 75 to 
50 per cent for paying oil fields which had obtained development consent 
before 16th March 1993: 
c. All PRT allowances (Oil allowance, Cross-Field Exploration & Appraisal 
allowance. Cross-Field Development allowance) were removed 6 
2Q 
II can be seen from the above reforms that the 1993 petroleum tax relaxation 
was different from the two previous relaxations (1983 and 1987-88) in terms of 
defining the areas which would benefit from this tax reform. This petroleum tax 
relaxation divided oil fields liable to PRT into two groups, according to 
development consent dale. These were: (a) oil fields developed after 16f March 
1993 which would not pay any PRT; and (b) oil fields developed before 1993 
which would be liable to PRT at 50 per cent, but with no allowances Now, in one 
form or another, the whole of the UKCS was to benefit - driven, according to the 
UK Inland Revenue (2003), by the following rationale: 
In his Budget speech on 16 March 1993 the Chancellor announced a 
number of significant reforms to the PRT regime. The changes were aimed 
at encouraging the further development of the UK's oil and gas resources by 
allowing companies to keep more of their profits, whether from additional 
investment in existing oil and gas fields, or from the development of new 
ones 
Again the concern was developmental - the contention being that the UKCS 
required sustained tax breaks in order for companies to continue investing. 
However, the switch to a more general tax break did signal disenchantment with 
the previous, more targeted regime of special allowances - which had in fact cost 
the government money in financial year 1991-1992 (see Table 1) as some firms 
were able to register negative PRT returns (see Rutledge and Wright 1998. 
p.8Q6). On the other hand, while the intention may have been to counterbalance 
'/-
the withdrawal of allowances by way of the reductions in PRT, this recalibration 
of the fiscal regime clearly benefited larger PRT-paying companies compared lo 
smaller independents which had been able to take advantage o( the various 
allowances iKnott. 1993. p.31). Indeed, an editorial in Oil & Gas Journal 
expressed the following, hard-hitting concern (1993. p.19): 
Companies will produce in the U.K. and use profits to explore for 
replacement reserves somewhere else. What the government has 
implemented, therefore, is a policy of protracted liquidation of the U.K. 
offshore producing industry' Reducing the 75% rate, thereby easing 
ihe incentive to shelter incomes against PRT. was a good start. Offsetting 
the rate cut with elimination of exploration cost deductibility will prove to have 
been a horrible finish 
What was the actual outcome? Table 3 shows that the anticipated negative 
impact on exploration activity did occur: exploration expenditure and drilling tailed 
away after 1993. with expenditure in 2000 barely registering a fifth in money 
terms of what it had been in 1992. Moreover, while Development drilling did 
register some increase, Development expenditure was continuously below its 
1992 level throughout the rest of the decade. Perhaps more damningly, total 
investment as a percentage of Gross Operating Surplus declined very 
substantially from its 1992 peak of 85.7%. down to just 14.7% in 2000 (Table 3). 
In addition, there is also no clear evidence to suggest that the tax reductions 
encouraged companies to invest in old fields. Such investment required the 
submission of a revised Field Development Programme (FDP) for approval to the 
28 
Ihen Department of Trade & Industry and only nine such FDPs were applied for 
between 1993 and 2000 (DTI, 2004) - in respect of Brae South, Brent, Claymore. 
Magnus. Osprey SW, Scapa, Scott. Tern and Wytch Farm (an onshore field). 
And even with respect to these it is doubtful whether their investment 
programmes were exclusively linked to fiscal stimulus. Redevelopment of the 
Brent oil field in 1993, for example, was certainly not due to the 1993 petroleum 
lax changes because the decision to redevelop was made in 1992 by Shell Oil 
i.e. before the tax changes were introduced (OPL, 1998. p.308; Kuyper. 2002). 
Low oil prices throughout the decade would of course also have played a role in 
constraining UKCS investment, but this simply poses the policy question more 
sharply, are tax breaks largely impotent in the face of market forces? While this 
was the case with respect to the government's stated objectives for the policy, 
the impact on company finances was substantially positive for the majors. For 
example. BP in its annual report noted (1993. p.29): 
From 1 July 1993. the Finance Act reduced the rate of Petroleum Revenue 
Tax (PRT) on existing fields from 75% to 50%, eliminated relief for 
exploration expenditure, and removed the PRT liability for new fields The 
benefit to 1993 after-tax income of the reduced rate on current production 
was about £60 million 
Table 6: The PRT Burden on Selected Companies 1990-2000 
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Consolidating this point. Table 6 shows this beneficial effect of the reduction in 
the rate of PRT on three other majors Exxon. Shell and Chevron-Texaco 
between 1993 and 2000 and also compares their experience with the impact on 
two smaller independents, Premier Oil and Viking. It clearly was the case that the 
various allowances had been of greater significance to this latter category of 
company - such that they started to face larger rather than lesser tax burdens -
Oil & Gas Journal's horrible finish' being borne out in practice. However, Table 5 
also brings into sharp relief the general complexity of the UKCS petroleum fiscal 
regime: because each company had a different portfolio of reserves in terms of 
discovery and development dates, and in terms field size, the attempts by 
government to micro-manage the development of the UKCS simply created 
greatly different tax positions (and therefore incentives) at company level. 
Finally, before concluding the paper by identifying the generic policy and 
conceptual issues raised by the history of the UKCS petroleum fiscal regime, 
Figure 4 facilitates a broad sweep appreciation of how this history was reflected 
in the performance of the UKs main vehicle for capturing oil and gas rents -
Petroleum Revenue Tax. 
Figure 4: Production and Petroleum Revenue Tax 1980-2000 
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The effect of the introduction of the new allowances after 1983 is clear While 
PRT revenues did show some recovery after 1993 this was well short of being 
commensurate with the increase in production. 
6. Previous Research and the Small Field Argument 
There is only one piece of research. Martin (1997). which occupies the same 
territory as the preceding sections and it came to more positive conclusions 
about the impact of the fiscal relaxations of 1983. 1987-88 and 1993. However. 
this was essentially for the following three reasons. Firstly. Martin did not 
consider the relaxations in terms of their actual rationales at the time: he did not 
research the stated purposes of government policy, instead assuming that this 
policy was simply about increasing production in general. Secondly, Martin 
divided UKCS fields into two groups, those which had started operations prior to 
1985, and those which did so post-1985. In other words, he did not calibrate his 
breakdown to reveal, separately, the impacts of the 1983, 1987 and 1993 
relaxations, actually ignoring the 1987 relaxation altogether. Thirdly, he did not 
explore when specific fields actually received development consent - thereby 
incorrectly relating the production of some fields to fiscal relaxations when in fact 
companies had applied for and received development consent prior to the 
enactment of the fiscal relaxations. Martin's results were therefore delivered by a 
flawed methodology which in effect sought to relate all of the changes in 
production of his post-1985 group of fields to the fiscal stimuli of 1983 and 1993. 
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Moreover, even results obtained under these terms showed that of the 
cumulative production from 'new' fields (post 1985 fields in Martin's study). 
34 3% was attributable to fields with an IRR of less than 15%. and 21.4% to 
fields which would have been developed anyway because their IRR was above 
15% without any requirement for tax breaks 
A second set of reflections with respect to the preceding literature, and indeed 
with respect to government policy, concerns Ihe small', 'marginal' field argument. 
This, as we have seen, figures prominently in all the decisions about changes to 
the UK's petroleum fiscal regime and continues to do so to this day - 1he 2009 
Budget introduces a new tax break for marginal fields (HM Treasury 2009. clause 
A.88. p. 164 and see belov; lor further details). The image being kindled and 
rekindled is that of costly new developments which could not proceed without 
special tax pnvileges (e.g. Moose 1982. Anderson 1993. Corzine 1995). But has 
this argument been empirically correct? There are already doubts in the work of 
its proponents. Moose (1982). for example, after having indicated that less than 
20% of the UK's undiscovered reserves would fall into the small category, uses a 
minimum discount rate as high as 17% to delineate the viability threshold. 
Secondly, and also providing evidence from the eighties. Bond et al (1987, p.51) 
state that "There is only a weak correlation between small fields and fields 
with low profitability.'. 
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Consolidating these doubts, we can add our own data, also from the critical 
period which launched the UK along the road of seeking to promote exploration 
and development by way of lax breaks. Table 7 shows the comparative cost of 
production for a selection of fields receiving development consent either before 
April 1982 or between April 1982 and 1987, and located in the strategic areas 
which the government was seeking to target. It reveals, first of all, that the costs 
of production (lifetime operating plus capital costs per barrel, largely based on 
actual outcomes) of small fields were generally significantly lower post-April 1982 
than they had been pre-1982. Table 7 also shows that the same applied to the 
pre and post 1982 medium and large fields (Tern compared with Murehison: 
Alwyn North compared with Cormorant North), and that smalt fields receiving 
development consent after April 1982 could also be cost competitive with both a 
medium field (Tern) and a large field (Alwyn North) which received development 
consent during the same period. These results would perhaps surprise policy 
makers, but they should not do. The point is that one would expect the costs of 
certain small fields to decline as an oil basin becomes more mature - simply 
because the investment in expensive infrastructure was made in a preceding, 
inilial phase. This emerges very clearly from a comparison of the capital costs 
per barrel of pre-April 1982 fields compared with 1982-1987 fields (Table 7). New 
small fields are often, as they have been in the UKCS. satellite developments of 
larger fields or situated conveniently close to existing infrastructure. Our previous 
contention that it is a priori unwise to try and use tax breaks to counter market 
signals in the oil and gas industry, can therefore now be amplified by an 
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awareness thai the target of these tax breaKs may turn out to be undeserving for 
other reasons. 'Small, 'marginal' fields are not necessarily more costly than 
larger fields and are not. as we have also seen, automatically incapable of 
meeting target IRR thresholds unaided. 
Table 7: Comparative Costs of Production for Small and Large Fields 
1982-87 and Pre-1982 
3* 
8. Why the Windfalls Got Away: The Consequences of a 'Non-Proprietorial' 
Fiscal Regime 
The conclusion from the preceding analysis could reasonably be that the fiscal 
stimuli afforded to companies operating on the UKCS in 1983. 1987 and 1993 
were both misconceived and failed to fulfil their original objectives, even after 
allowing for a measure of hindsight. However, these were not just simple errors 
of judgment at particular conjunctures - they reflected a more general 
perspective on a government's role with respect to its oil and gas sector, a 
perspective which Mommer (2002) conceptualises as Non-Proprietorial 
Governance'. The presence of Non-Proprietorial governance in oil and gas is 
signalled by a fiscal regime which in effect assumes a certain responsibility for 
the profitability of oil and gas companies operating on its territory by basing 
taxation increasingly just on the profitability of the sector, a perspective which 
draws succour from an academic literature concerned to promote the virtues of 
'efficient', 'neutral', Ricardian rent-seeking resource taxation.' This contrasts with 
Proprietorial Governance' under which a government is more simply a landlord 
seeking to maximise rent from sovereign ownership of its resources - the 
profitability of oil and gas companies is a function of international oil prices, and 
not a legitimate concern of government seeking to represent the interests of its 
citizens. The presence of revenue raising via Royalties is the symbol of 
Proprietorial Governance - Royalties express the principle that access to 
sovereign resources requires a payment whatever the economic circumstances 
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faced by companies. Royalties are more properly seen as a cost of production 
rather than a tax. 
While this distinction between Non-Proprietorial and Proprietorial governance, 
may not be so sharp in reality- as Walde (2003) suggests, most petroleum fiscal 
regimes combine proprietorial and non-proprietorial elements - associated with 
the Non-Proprietorial perspective is the controversial contention that revenue 
maximisation from a government's oil and gas resources is not at all incompatible 
with fiscal stimuli for companies. This argument, expressed most cogently in 
support of a 'Resource Rent Tax' (a tax which does not generate revenue until 
the original investment has been recouped plus a rate of return - see Garnaut 
and Clunies-Ross. 1975; Smith. 1999) is that there can be a win-win' situation 
for both companies and governments if fiscal relaxations stimulate increased 
production. In this way. with a lower rate of tax which attracts companies 
governments can actually extract more lax revenue than they otherwise might 
have done because production, stimulated by the tax break, is higher than it 
otherwise would have been However, as well as finding that the relaxations in 
the UK's petroleum fiscal regime did not perform in terms of their stated 
objectives, we have also found that this apparently comfortable fallback position 
lacks substance. 
Looking back now to Table 1. it can be seen that between 1993 and 1999. UKCS 
oil production increased by 37% and gas production by 50%. These were 
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dramatic increases which occurred against the backdrop of low international oil 
prices. However, to the extent that the reduction in PRT contributed to this 
increase by making it more profitable to maximise production in the short-term, 
the increase in government revenues was not the commensurate one indicated 
by the proponents of 'win-win'. Non-Proprietorial governance. Indeed, the 
generosity of Ihe UK's petroleum fiscal regime in the 1990s caused the leading 
industry authority on international petroleum fiscal regimes. Petroconsultants 
(1996). to comment: 
Of the 20 largest produong regimes only the UK. Argentina and the US 
generate a State Take of less than 70%. The UK stands out as particularly 
lenient with a State Take of only 33% Indeed, of the 110 regimes reviewed 
only Ireland generates a lower State Take than the UK 
The main beneficiaries of the UK government adopting an increasingly Non-
Proprietonal stance were therefore the companies, and in this context il is worth 
repeating the cynical view of one of them as previously cited in Rulledge & 
Wright {1998. p.811); 
The UK North Sea provides a strong stream of earnings and cash flow with 
relatively modest reinvestment needs. This is important for the funding of the 
Company's plans in other strategic areas' (Oryx Energy. 1996, p.4)." 
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For Mommer such an outcome is an entirely predictable consequence of non-
proprietorial governance as he observes (2002. p.235): 
A few years will probably be enough to show the heavy losses in fiscal 
revenues that non-proprietonal governance will entail for exporting countries. 
Lessons may be learned in the future, but at what price? 
The price for the UK can be calculated in various ways, but let's just assume that 
the relatively modest tax take per barrel of 1988 (i.e. well after the 1986 slump in 
oil pnces and also after the 1983 and 1987 fiscal relaxations) had applied 
throughout the decade of the 1990s. The UK's fiscal revenues from its oil and 
gas production would have been some £16 billion higher in money of the day 
Finally, we have already demonstrated that the UK governments introduction of 
a Supplementary Charge of Corporation Tax, while it might initially have seemed 
to indicate a change towards more Proprietorial governance, in fact did not 
prevent companies from enjoying a very substantial windfall between 2002 and 
2007. This happened because the additional taxation measures were introduced 
both within a Non-Proprietorial context, and in a Non-Proprietorial way. Firstly, 
the UK's mam rent targeting device has been allowed to wither away, even 
among those fields potentially liable to pay PRT (93 fields in 2007) only a 
minority actually did so (32 fields, see Earp, 2008) Secondly, remaining Royalty 
obligations were abolished as the Supplementary Charge was introduced. 
Thirdly, a 100% investment allowance against both standard Corporation Tax 
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and Ihe Supplementary Charge was Introduced at the same time as the 
Supplementary Charge. Given the size of the windfalls which UKCS companies 
have been enjoying and the small portion of them which they have been 
reinvesting in the UKCS. the latter measure particularly exposes the UK's Non-
Proprietorial regime. There is scarcely a lack of investible funds for the 
government to be concerned about. 
Another windfall has got away and the root cause has been the gradual 
development of the UK's petroleum fiscal regime into a fully-fledged Non-
Proprietorial regime, a process which commenced tn the early nineteen-eighties 
and which continues to be entrenched in the present. With respect to the latter, 
the UK's 2008 Pre-Budget Report reveals that, even in the context of recent oil 
price highs, the company lobby has yet again been successful in persuading 
government that a special tax relief is necessary for them to develop marginal' 
fields 
Following further discussions with stakeholders, the Government is today 
publishing rts proposals for further reforms to the North Sea fiscal regime 
These will encourage investment through incentivising production from 
marginal fields, supporting asset trades and simplifying the regime 
HM Treasury {2008, paragraph 4.28, p.73) 
The 2009 Budget itself then delivered a new 'Field Allowance' which "will act to 
reduce Ihe initial lax paid by qualifying new developments* (HM Treasury 2009. 
clause A 88. p.164). 
-:, 
Footnotes 
' The unit sates value of UK oil and gas sales is used as the appropriate pricing benchmark 
because the UK's hydrocarbon production includes both oil and gas. and gas generally sells (or a 
lower equivalent price than oil Using the crude oil price as a reference price would therefore 
imply a greater company advantage than has actually Deen the case. Moieover. using unit value, 
which is calculated by dividing UKCS oil and gas sales revenue by UK oil-equivalent hydrocarbon 
production, is also more appropriate because i t « a measure related to actually realised rather 
than imputed revenues. 
' Kemp ana his colleagues have wntten extensively about UKCS taxation, but their focus has 
generally been on evaluating the effect ot tax changes on different fields, not on testing 
government policy in terms of its stated objectives 
1
 The PRT safeguard' and tapering' provisions were still retained - that PRT is reduced to zero rt 
'adjusted' profits were less than 30% of accumulated investment and that PRT should not exceed 
80% of the excess of these profits above the 30% of investment mark (see Kemp and Cohen. 
1979. p 42 for a discussion ol these provisions) 
* This same point <s made differently by Rutledge and Wright (1998. p806) on the basis of the 
data in Marlins 1997 paper - 10.9% of the increase in output between 1991 and 1995 came from 
fields which were developed with IRRs lower than 15% 
5
 It should be noted that Piper Alpha also contributed to this outcome and in two different ways 
First of all Piper Alpha entailed a ma^ or and direct toss of production - the field accounted for 7% 
of UK oil production according to Martin (1997 p 2) Secondly, as Rutledge & Wright noted (1998. 




 The Cross-Field allowances were abolished lor ihe future but remained (and theoretically still 
remain) available for the fields to which they originally applied (see HM Revenue & Customs 
2008). Moreover, transitional arrangements were made to cover commitments pno' to the cut-off 
point (see HM Revenue & Customs. OT14040). 
' This perspective is. for example, implicit or explicit m the work of Kemp ana Devereux 
Attempting to use the concepts of tax efficiency and tax neutrality (to avoid distorting' investment 
decisions) means relying on assumptions about the behaviour of markets which are far from 
being present in any market, and are particularly not to be found in oil or gas markets 
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Notes: (a) Tax revenue data is provided on a UK tax year oasis (to end March) and this was reconciled with calendar year data by 
maximising the overlap i.e. calendar year 2Q07 is matched with tax year 2007/08 {b} the Pre-Corporation Tax rate of return for UKCS 
companies was arrived at by deducting al! special taxes (PRT. Royalties. SPD. Licence Fees, Supplementary Charge) from their Net 
Operating Surplus (ONS senes LRWY) and then recalculating the rate of return on Net Capital Employed (ONS series LRXCJ (c) the 
category of non-UKCS companies used in the final column includes only non-financial companies 
Table 2: UKCS Company Post Tax and Investment Surpluses Since the 



















































Source: BERR Oil & Gas Information 
Note: Gross Operating Surplus = Total Income minus Operaling Expenses (except 
Depreciation) Gross rather than Net Operating Surplus is the appropriate definition of 
surplus for the purpose of this calculation because it includes Depreciation - which is not 
a cash cost and which is therefore available as a source of investible funds 
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Figure 1: Tax Take pet Barrel Equivalent of UKCS Oil and Gas Production 
;<p * 1 > • • • • 1 ' • 
H i i i H > 1 i H i i i i 1 i i i H H I U 
Sources: derived from BERR Oil & Gas Information: DTI {former UK Department of 
Trade & Industry) (1980-1992) 
Nole: the unit value oi the UK's hydrocarbon production is used as the appropnate price 
in these calculations - derived by dividing total UKCS Sales Revenue from oil and gas 
by oil + gas production in barrels of oil equivalent. 
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Source: BERR Oil & Gas Information 
Note: see Note (c) to Figure 3 
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Figure 2: Indices of UK Production. Taxation and International Oil Prices 
1980-2007 
30 
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Source; Table 1 
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Figure 3: Offshore Exploration and Development Wells Drilled between 1980 and 1987 
Source: DTI (1980-1992. Appendix 2) 
Notes: (a) as is Customary, Appraisal Wells are included together with drilling purely (or 
exploration purposes (b) the original data has been converted lo match the areas covered by the 
legislation by designating East of Scotland' • East of Shetland as 'Central S Northern North 
Sea' (c) thefe ate major discrepancies between this data and a more recent historical series 
compiled by BERR (formerly the Department of Trade & Industry), l ie reason lor which BERR 
notes as. 'the numbers now published ma/ differ from earlier years Sidetracks in earlier years 
(pre-1988') cannot be verified as lo whether they are geological sidetracks' (8ERR. UKCS 
Dnllmg Activity since 1964) For the purposes of Figure 3 we have prelerred to use the data which 
was available at the time and which would have been the dalaset referred to at the lime lor the 
purposes of policy-making. However, for comparative purposes. Table 2 contains the more recent 
BERR historical dataset 
-C. 
Table 5: Fields Potentially Benefiting from the 1987-88 Petroleum Tax 
Relaxation 
Source: DTI (2004) for fields and development approval dates. OPL (1998) foi 
discovery dates 
Notes; (a) IRR figures were calculated by using Wood Mackenzie GEM (2004.V.3.01) to 
generate the three scenarios (b) total benefits to oilfields from the Cross Field 
Development Allowance were calculated based on each field's annual summary cash 
flow statement generated Wood MacKenzie's GEM (2004.v3.01). 
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Table 6: The PRT Burden on Selected Companies 1990-2000 
Source: calculations based on data extracted from Wood MacKenzie's GEM (2004. v 
3 01) 
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Source: BERR Oil & Gas Informaiion 
Table 7: Comparative Costs of Production for Small. Medium and Large Fields 
53 
1982-1987 and Pre-1982 
-.'. 
Source: derived from Wood Mackenzie G E M (2004) 
Notes: (a) the selection of ((elds was arrived a l (1) by omitting some very small fields which were 
developed between 1982 and 1967 (Cyrus. Innes. Duncan Deveron and Peuonella) because 
these developments were not triggered mainly by commercial considerations (2) Alwyn North is 
selected as the only large f * ld developed between 1982 and 1967 (3) Eider was the only small 
field to be developed in the Northern North Sea (4) Clyde RobRoy. Ivanhoe. Scapa. Balmoral 
and Highlander are the small fields developed in the Central North Sea between 1982 and 1987 
IS) the selection of the Pre-1982 fields sought to achieve comparability with the 1962-1987 group 
in terms o* size and location (6) Tern and Murchison provide the available comparison for 
medium-sized fields (b) Reserves are proven + probable oil I* proven * probable oil-equivalent 
gas where a field has associated gas) as estimated in 2004 (c) Reserve size categorisation as 
large or small reflects convention in the literature e.g. see Martin (1997) and Kemp and Rose 
(1983) (d) the basts of the costing is an undiscounted lifetime average per barrel expressed In 
real terms: the pre-2004 annual data are actual outcomes converted to 2004 constant prices (Jan 
2004 £ converted to $). the post-2004 to anticipated end-of-life cost data are projected and 
incorporate Wood Mackenzie's inflation assumption {2 5% pa) G E M 2004 rather than the latest 
version was preferred to avoid the effect of the post-2004 increase in oil prices on reserve 
estimates (upward revaluations which could distort cost comparisons) (e) the production life 
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